out, but is seldom noted, is that this occurred within democracies where the relative losers -the overwhelming majority -could in principle have used the political system to block or reverse rising inequality.
Why did they not do so? Two ready hypotheses are: Heightened inequality is in fact in the majority's best interest and this is well understood. Or, the majority is being hoodwinked.
The first hypothesis is difficult to defend. Research demonstrates that beyond some level necessary to bring forth economic incentives, greater inequality correlates with lessened economic dynamism Rodrik 1994: Easterly 2002; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Garrison, and Lee 1992) ; with poorer public health and shortened longevity (Marmot 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett. 2006; Subramanian and Kawachi 2004) , with greater racial and ethnic tensions and higher crime rates (Kelly 2000; Fajnzylber et. al 2002) ; with lessened social mobility (Jäntti, et. al. 2006; d=Addio 2007 ) ; and with a weakening of democracy (Bostany 2006; Phillips 2002; Wolin 2008) . As for the second hypothesis, that people are hoodwinked, a glance at history reveals that peoples have only very infrequently contested inequality. And when they have done so, it was generally in the wake of dramatically worsened conditions for the less-privileged.
Class or other group-based inequality can be maintained by either physical or ideological force.
1 Physical force has often been necessary for initially establishing and solidifying a hierarchical social structure. However, brute force is relatively inefficient in that it generates strong resentment and the constant threat of insurrection. It is also costly in terms of policing resources. A far more efficient and effective long-run strategy is for the elites to generate an ideological system that convinces "both themselves -and more important, members of subordinate groups -of the moral and intellectual legitimacy of the existing social order..."
Typically, legitimations are both cognitive and normative in character. That is, they not only inform as to what is but as to what ought to be as well. As to the latter, Kelman notes that "What characterizes legitimacy at its core is that it refers to the moral basis of social interaction"
(2001: 55). Legitimations need not be literally true: "the issue of 'truth' is essentially irrelevant to an ideology's ability to legitimize and justify group-based social inequality: ideologies can serve as legitimizing instruments regardless of whether they are 'true' or 'false' in any epistemic sense" (Sidanius et al 2001: 310-11 ). There will, nonetheless, be an insistence on the truth value of legitimization systems whether provided by religion in tradition-guided societies or by social science in modern societies.
In pre-modern traditional societies, religion served as the predominant, if not nearly the exclusive means of legitimation. 8 Religion provides a status to prevailing social institutions that transcends their human genesis. As Berger has expressed this, "Religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference " (1967: 33) . In this manner, social institutions are accorded the stability and inevitability that is ascribed to the ultimate spiritual and material realms. Religious legitimation of social institutions provides individuals with enormous solace by providing them with an ultimate sense of rightness. It is in this manner that inequality was provided with legitimacy. It was the will of god, or the gods, or the cosmically mandated, and therefore the way it must be. As Berger puts it, "One of the very important social functions of theodicies is, indeed, their explanation of the socially prevailing inequalities of power and privilege....theodicies provide the poor with a meaning for their poverty, but may also provide the rich with a meaning for their wealth " (1967: 59) . 9 Religion enabled the pharos of ancient Egypt convincingly to claim themselves to be gods. Elsewhere, from the ancient Mayans in the Americas to the late medieval era in Europe, rulers would pretend, even to themselves, of course, that they possessed special relationships to the gods, or divine rights to rule. Their special status justified their inordinate share of everything.
Religious legitimation of inequality typically worked at two levels. Directly, it claimed that the status quo distribution was appropriate to the cosmic order. Indirectly, it diverted attention away from the material world to a spiritual or moral domain. 10 It reinforced a static view of reality. Every thing and everyone had their proper assigned place in this god-given reality. 11 It devalued a this-worldly existence in favor of a spiritual realm, and thereby depicted the greater hardships and suffering of the less well off as unworthy of serious attention. As pyramids, temples, cathedrals, and churches attest, the material costs of maintaining the worldly manifestations of this legitimation structure were enormous. 12 What may have been the most extreme and effective role in legitimating inequality by religion occurred in India. A frozen religious stratification assigned everyone a place or function. Indian Brahmanism was brought to India in the second millennium B.C. by Aryan conquerors from what is now southern Russia. These invaders developed a perfectly rigid caste system that served to perpetuate their dominance and induce the acquiescence of the lower classes. As Hindu doctrine, everyone's status is determined by his or her karma or behavior in a previous life, and in this sense, everyone deserves his or her current status. If good karma is expressed in this life, then promotion to a higher caste in a next life becomes possible through reincarnation.
Good karma was understood to mean a resigned and obedient life. All other forms of personal achievement were excluded in principle. Caste membership prescribed occupation and sumptuary rights. This static world was depicted as perfect, a world in which everyone and everything had its proper place. Thus to contest the status quo was not only to violate the sacred order but to condemn oneself to a yet lower and more miserable status in the next life. And, of course, there was no good reason to be dissatisfied with one's miserable condition. It is one's just deserts and it is merely temporary, only this short lifetime. A virtuous life -not rocking the boat -will ensure a better deal next time.
It was because religions serve this legitimation function that Marx asserted that
AReligion is the opiate of the people@ (Marx 1844 ). Yet the fact that legitimation may serve to augment or preserve the privileges of the elite does not entail that the world should be broken down into good guys and bad guys. Elites sincerely believe the doctrines that serve their interests. 13 They believe them to represent the will of the gods or the exigencies of science. And they typically believe such doctrines to be in the best interests of everyone.
EMERGENT CAPITALISM AND THEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
In an important sense, Protestantism served as a transition religion between a predominantly traditional agricultural world dominated by Catholic doctrine and a more modern commercial one dominated by secular thought. The rise and spread of markets slowly eroded the self-sufficient communities of the middle ages in which somewhat of a safety net was provided for the poor. Moreover, the expansion of market society generated an ever-expanding class of free laborers --a proletariat --that lived largely outside the support of traditional communities.
Members of this class possessed neither ownership nor rights to the means of production. They could survive only by selling their labor power to an owner of such resources.
Catholic doctrine fit the legitimation needs of medieval European societies, but it was not well suited to the evolving institutions of capitalism. For instance, the Catholic Church was uncomfortable with profits, interest, alienable property, and even markets generally.
14 Protestantism, however, evolved most rigorously where capitalism was emerging most robustly, and thus came to be doctrinally better suited to legitimate the evolving institutions of markets and private property.
Protestantism, especially in its Calvinist expression, legitimated an uncharitable attitude toward the poor --the far greater part of society. According to the Calvinist doctrine of election, God had chosen the saved and the damned. Thus if one were poor, it could be presumed that thus was the will of God. The doctrinally privileged position of the poor within Catholicism 15 and the virtue of charity gave way under Protestantism to a reduced level of concern for the poor, relieving those of means from any strong sense of responsibility to provide assistance to the poor, either individually through charity or collectively through social welfare policy. To survive, the poor would have to locate someone to hire them. This put pressure on the unemployed to accept any form of employment, no matter how onerous, dangerous, or ill-paid, thereby keeping downward pressure on wages and thus favoring profits. And by relieving the well-off of the need to be charitable, it left them with more surplus to save and invest.
Also, unlike Catholic doctrine, Protestantism had little problem with the pursuit of wealth. 16 It had little difficulty with those capitalist institutions and practices that the Church had found so opprobrious, such as alienable land, market-determined prices, profit and interest.
And almost as if to take all the fun out of being elite, Protestantism, again especially in its Calvinist expression, discouraged luxury or superfluous consumption and thereby encouraged saving.
The Idea of Equality
The expansion of capitalist markets slowly increased the size and wealth of a class whose economic power was grounded in its ownership of productive capital as opposed to land. But this expanding bourgeoisie encountered resistance to its quest for political power and social recognition commensurate with its wealth, and its struggle for power and status ultimately set the ideological framework for the evolution of the doctrine of social equality. This, of course, was hardly their intent. They merely sought the same rights, privileges, and status as the aristocracy.
They had no intention of sharing any of this with the working and peasant classes socially beneath themselves. Indeed, they actively attempted to block any extension of their acquired gains to those below.
Initially viewed as socially inferior to the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie had to justify its bid for equality. And it was problematic to claim equality with the aristocracy only for their own class, since such an argument was hardly different in kind from the aristocracy=s insistence on its uniqueness. Further, the aristocracy had tradition, or the weight of the past, on its side.
Hence, doctrines that suggested what might be called a universal humanity postulate B that all humans everywhere are equal B were embraced. Any threat that this might lead to redistribution seemed remote, given the elite=s monopoly on political power.
THE EARLY RISE OF ASCIENTIFIC@ LEGITIMATION OF INEQUALITY
As religious legitimation weakened with the rise of secular society, inequality came to be increasingly legitimated in economic terms, although until fairly recently it was frequently supplemented by religious argument. 17 An early secular expression found in the works of (1924: 288) . 19 The utility of poverty doctrine also generated arguments to tax workers to force them to work longer hours for their subsistence. Thus, even David Hume, who generally rejected the utility of poverty argument, would nonetheless recommend imposing a tax on the poor to goad them into working more (1870: Part 2, no. 8, ATaxes@: 247). And to appease social conscience as to the workers= welfare, it was argued that having either greater free time or more income would result in debauchery or sinful behavior on the part of workers.
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Low wages and poverty were thus in everyone=s interest B the Autility of poverty.@
The French Revolution, with its radical call for a new order grounded in liberté, égalité, et fraternité spread fear of the lower classes among the elites, especially in the wake of the assumption of power by Robespierre and the onset of the Reign of Terror. Thus the calls for democracy would be resisted, often with property requirements for the franchise. The wealthy classes B the aristocracy and bourgeoisie B feared that the realization of wider freedoms and democracy would spell the dispossession of the wealthy. The ideology that was at the service of their retention of privilege was that their privilege was functionally good for society, essential for social harmony and progress. The elites were superior, they believed, carrying and developing the requisites for civilization.
However, as doctrines of equality became ever-more entrenched in social consciousness, the idea of the innate superiority of the elite weakened, and indeed would ultimately become politically taboo. To legitimate their privilege, the elites would appeal evermore to the functional legitimacy of inequality in the terms of the evolving Ascience@ of political economy.
Adam Smith is generally acknowledged as the father of modern economics. This credit comes to him for conceptualizing an economy in which the forces of supply and demand guide the economy as a whole toward a state of equilibrium. Borrowing from the Physiocrats, Smith played an important role in applying the mechanistic cosmology of natural law to the social world. Markets came to be seen as natural phenomena, and thus the outcomes of markets possessed a nature-like character not unlike the natural laws of the physical world. If left alonelaissez-faire -then resources would be allocated efficiently. The distribution of income, wealth, and privilege that flowed from market processes was natural, and therefore good. 21 No assistance need or should be offered to the poor.
Of critical importance to this cosmology is the view that in pursuing their own selfinterests, individuals further a higher social outcome that was not part of their intention, as if guided by Aan invisible hand.@ Pursuing one=s self-interest, which most traditional religions had viewed as sinful, now became morally, socially, and Ascientifically@ respectable.
Whereas Smith rejected the utility of poverty argument, 22 and his views were generally charitable toward the poor, the greater part of his disciples maintained harsher views toward the less fortunate. They continued to embrace the utility of poverty argument --nothing can be done to help the poor without making them and everyone else worse off. Of the English Poor Laws, for instance, David Ricardo asserted: "The principle of gravitation is not more certain than the tendency of such laws to change wealth and vigor into misery and weakness...until at last all classes should be infected with the plague of universal poverty" (1819: 86).
In addition to the utility of poverty argument, the post-Smithian classical economists provided grounding for three additional arguments that could be used politically to block pressures for greater equality: the Malthusian population doctrine, the wages-fund doctrine, and a Atrickle-down@ thesis.
The Malthusian Population Doctrine
In 1798 the Reverend Thomas Malthus re-crafted a surplus population doctrine 23 that served for 70 years as a principle legitimation doctrine for inequality. 24 The doctrine he set forth in On Population was grounded in his contention that APopulation, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetic ratio@ (1970: 9). The reason for this bleak condition is that the poor are ruled by their passions 25 in a world in which the supply of land is ultimately fixed. Thus to improve the lot of the poor through higher wages or welfare measures would only enable the poor to parent more children, putting further strains on available land, and thereby decreasing productivity and general economic well being.
Consequently, an argument for greater equality Aoffends against the cause of truth@ (1970: 68). Malthus's population doctrine generated a quietist attitude toward the poor: "No possible sacrifices of the rich, particularly in money, could for any time prevent the recurrence of distress among the lower members of society, whoever they were" (1960: 39). Nothing can be done.
He noted that
Inequality and the misery of the poor are part of the divine scheme. 27 Moreover, Malthus= population doctrine laid the responsibility for poverty on the poor themselves. They were incapable of controlling their sexual appetites. The rich need feel no guilt and no need to be charitable.
His population thesis was to serve as a principle doctrine for legitimating inequality until late in the nineteenth century when the failure of improved living standards to produce concomitant increases in family size sent the threat of Malthusian over-population into remission. However, it would resurface again in the early 1970s in response to food shortages and starvation in several poor countries, against a backdrop of a post-World War Two population explosion in the third world and a growing concern that natural resources were running out.
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Malthus added two other justifications for inequality, and especially for the existence of a non-producing landlord class. Unlike most members of the Classical School who believed the economy would be automatically self-adjusting, Malthus believed that under certain conditions there could be a Aglut@ of commodities due to Aineffectual demand.@ For demand to be adequate AThere must ...be a considerable class of persons who have both the will and power to consume more material wealth than they produce... [and] In this class the landlords no doubt stand preeminent@ (1964: 400). Second, the elite status of this leisure class is merited, because its behavior and consumption have led to the development of Aall the noblest exertions of human genius, all the finer and more delicate emotions of the soul@ (1970: 176-77) . Further, AIt is an historical truth which cannot for a moment be disputed, that the first formation and subsequent preservation and improvement of our present constitution, and of the liberties and privileges which have so long distinguished Englishmen, are mainly due to a landed aristocracy@ (1964: 380) . Preservation of a non-productive class was thus the key to retaining and furthering the benefits of civilization itself.
The Wages-Fund Doctrine
Classical economists argued that there was a fixed fund of capital out of which wages could be paid. This Awages fund@ was made up of previously produced items that labor consumes, principally such goods as food, housing, and clothing. 29 This fund was fixed by output in the previous period, thus carrying the implication that any attempt to raise general wages would be futile. The wages fund doctrine meant that combinations of workers (labor unions) could not increase the welfare of the working class, and if they were successful at raising the wages of their own members, it would be at the expense of other workers. In this manner, the wages-fund doctrine became a powerful ideological weapon against struggles of workers to organize in order to improve labor's well-being. 30 In England, it gave Ascientific@ legitimacy to the Anti-Combination Acts of 1799 that had been legislated to curb the rising power of the working class. Even John Stuart Mill would embrace the doctrine until 1869.
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TheATrickle-down@ Thesis
Since at least Adam Smith, the most ever-present economic doctrine legitimating inequality has been what has come to be called the Atrickle-down@ thesis. 32 Economic dynamism results from saving and investment, and it is presumed that only the well-off carry out these functions. The presumption is that if there were greater equality, there would be less saved and invested and thus less economic growth. Because everyone benefits from a dynamic, growing economy, inequality benefits even the poor B the benefits trickle down to everyone, or in another common metaphor, a rising tide lifts all boats. Accordingly, even social thinkers and political economists such as John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall, who sincerely sympathized with the poor, nonetheless argued that any substantial lessening of inequality would sap the springs of capital accumulation.
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More recently, as will be seen more fully below, the trickle-down doctrine became central to supply-side economics and tax cuts for the rich beginning with Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain.
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND THE CONTRIBUTORY ARGUMENT
The latter part of the 19 th century witnessed a revolution in the nature of economic theory and increased sophistication with whick economic science would legitimate inequality. 34 The classical school had referred to itself as political economy because it saw economics as the handmaiden of politics. It typically examined economic phenomena within the broad institutional framework of society. The neoclassical revolution narrowed the focus almost exclusively to the market nexus in an attempt, as George Stigler has put it, to transform economics Afrom an art, in many respects literary, to a science of growing rigor@ (Stigler 1941: 1).
Contemporary mainstream economics is constructed upon the fundamental orientation set forth during this neoclassical revolution. Indeed, it is often still referenced as neoclassical economics. The most potent doctrine that neoclassical economics would re-craft and add to the already formidable arsenal of economic doctrines that legitimate inequality is the contributory approach.
The rudiments of the contributory defense of inequality had been found in the works of many classical economists, most notably Jean-Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior, and Frédéric Bastiat.
But its modern and far more theoretically sophisticated expression rests upon the marginal productivity theory of factor payments set forth at the end of the nineteenth century, especially the version developed by American economist John Bates Clark. Marginal productivity theory can be expressed in a purely objective manner as an explanation of how income is distributed in a market economy, without necessarily implying anything Afair@ or Agood@ about this distribution. In the preface to The Distribution of Wealth, Clark asserted AIt is the purpose of this work to show that the distribution of income of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent creates@ (1908: v) . 35 However, it has been easy for theorists to slide from the positive theory of marginal productivity to a normative theory of distribution based on contribution. Clark himself was quick to do so and to hold up his theory as a defense of the distribution of income in modern capitalist economies against socialist critics. 36 Clark wed the analytics of marginal analysis and natural law cosmology to legitimate the prevailing distribution of income.
The contributory defense of inequality holds as its fundamental tenet that individuals ought to receive rewards from the economy that are commensurate with their contributions to the economy. Thus, the concept of desert is central to the contributory approach: individuals deserve more from the economy to the extent that they contribute more to it. This normative variant of marginal productivity theory --the marginal contributory theory of distributive justice --is unquestionably the most influential example of this contributory view.
In its modern textbook expression, marginal productivity theory seeks to explain the distribution of income among factors of production (inputs), and therefore, indirectly, among individuals who own these factors. It assumes an idealized competitive market economy, wherein factors of production are compensated on the basis of their marginal contribution to the creation of market value. All units of a particular factor of production are compensated on the basis of the market value directly attributable to the last unit of that factor hired, known as the value of marginal product (VMP) of that factor. The VMP of any factor of production is dictated by three factors: a) the technical productivity of this factor; b) the demand for the output this factor contributes to producing; and c) the supply of this factor.
The theory implies that if a worker's earnings are low, it is because the VMP for the type of labor or other factor that she supplies is low. To some extent, the underlying factors that explain this may be beyond her control. Perhaps her technical productivity is low because she is working with aged or inadequate capital. Perhaps there is weak market demand for the output of her industry. Or perhaps there are too many others competing to supply labor services like hers.
But whatever the specific reason, all factors of production are assumed to contribute to production, and all are compensated on the basis of their marginal contribution.
Marginal productivity theory insists that it is only in an abstract, perfectly competitive economy that factors of production would in fact tend to be compensated on the basis of their marginal productivity. It also often claims that this is the Anatural@ pattern of distribution in a market economy. It does not necessarily imply there is anything ethically defensible about it.
But from this basic theoretical framework, apologists for inequality have crafted ways to generate ethical defenses. These have taken two basic forms. The first appeals to a Anatural law of economic life@ that involves some variant of the following chain of reasoning: a) Distribution on the basis of marginal contribution naturally emerges in an idealized, competitive market economy; b) Market economies have brought in the greatest material gains in human history, and should be treated with respect; c) To interfere with the patterns of distribution in a market economy would be to threaten the foundations of the market economy; d) Therefore, the greater good dictates that the patterns of distribution that arise in a market economy be accepted. Implicit in this chain of reasoning is the claim that differences in economic outcomes create the basic incentives to productive activity in a market system, and that therefore to alter such differences would impair economic dynamism, to the ultimate detriment of everyone.
This argument is also expressed in terms of general equilibrium theory, whereby a perfectly functioning market economy is depicted as the most efficient system for fulfilling material human wants. Accordingly, any departure from pure laissez-faire market economics to reduce inequality would impair efficiency and reduce social welfare.
The second strategy for using marginal productivity theory to justify distributive outcomes is what might be called an appeal to fairness in ownership: Aif you made it, it=s yours.@ If whatever a given class of inputs receives in a market economy reflects the output attributable to that class of inputs, then to deny it that compensation would be a form of stealing or exploitation;
conversely, to transfer more to it would be arbitrary. Those who express this normative twist to justify tax cuts for the wealthy have used the pithy slogan: AAfter all, it=s your money.@ Together, the positive and normative variants of marginal productivity combine a
Ascientific@ view of the social world with an ethical view amenable to huge economic disparities.
However, the contributory approach is open to three principal criticisms:
First, it is impossible to meaningfully isolate the marginal contribution of any one factor of production from the contributions of others. This is not just a practical measurement problem (although it is that as well); it goes deeper. In many cases, factors of production are so interdependent in the productive process that the very concept of assigning a marginal product to any one factor becomes meaningless. 
THE KEYNESIAN ANOMALY
It is by no means the case that all economic theories have served to legitimate inequality.
Indeed, many economists have found excessive inequality to be one of capitalism=s major failings, not only because they believed it unjust, but also because they believed it impairs economic dynamism. However, these economists and their theories have generally remained outside the mainstream of economic thinking. A striking exception, insofar as he might be considered mainstream, was John Maynard Keynes.
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Keynes= economics matured during the Great Depression of the 1930s. In the face of dramatic contraction in production and massive unemployment, the prescription of the prevailing mainstream of economic theory was that the economy should be left alone so as to spontaneously return to dynamism and full employment. Keynes challenged this. Under certain conditions market magic will not do the trick. To grasp why, he focused upon economic aggregates such as total demand, investment, savings, consumption, and employment. He concluded that the crisis was due to inadequate total demand, and that government intervention in the form of greater spending was necessary to restore the economy to full employment. But he added a special, radical kicker: inequality was part of the problem! Because the less well off spend a larger percentage of their incomes, redistributing income to them would increase total consumption and thereby help protect the economy from falling into recessions or depressions due to inadequate total spending.
40
Keynes also claimed that a science of economics could not be value-free, 41 permitting him to continue to wear the mantle of science when he claimed that AThe outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes@ (Keynes 1936: 372) .
Keynes= view of inequality challenged the trickle-down economics that had dominated economic and political thinking since the origins of modern economics more than 150 years earlier. 42 He legitimated government intervention to reduce inequality, not merely in the name of justice, but for the well-being of the economy, and therefore of society. His doctrine represented an ideological reversal: in place of trickle-down theory legitimating inequality, Keynesian economics depicted greater equality generating greater economic dynamism --a trickle-up theory.
Although Keynesian economics was highly influential for more than 30 years, its dominance occurred during the decade of the 1960s. And ironically, the doctrine would encounter heavy weather just as it was gaining its fullest acceptance (in 1971, Nixon was the first prominent Republican to embrace Keynesian economics).
Inequality lessened during the three decades when Keynesian economics was highly influential, suggesting that the accepted economic theory tends to be supportive of the real-world status quo.
DRAWING UPON CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND SOCIAL THOUGHT TO LEGITIMATE INEQUALITY
The mainstay argument justifying inequality in the U.S. today --the (marginal) contributory approach --draws its supposed scientific status from neoclassical doctrine. As Justice never permits the state B or anyone else B to take legitimately-acquired property from some individuals in order to give to others, no matter how great the benefits to recipients, relative to the costs to donors. All such transfers would involve confiscation or coercive taxation and thus constitute an unacceptable infringement of the right to self-ownership. 43 Any resulting reduction of inequality would involve greater injustice than the toleration of it.
The most influential statement of libertarianism is Robert Nozick=s 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 44 Nozick=s main contention is that for a government to intervene in the market-given pattern of distributive outcomes involves unacceptable infringement upon individual rights, and is therefore unjust. Nozick argues that the difference between the libertarian and marginal contributory approaches can be reduced to the difference between entitlement and desert. We are entitled to anything we get without violating others= rights, but this does not mean we deserve it, in the sense that we have earned it.
This concept of libertarian entitlement helps defenders of inequality resolve the question of unearned assets (such as natural talents and inherited property) that poses a dilemma for the contributory defense of inequality. It is not that people deserve their inherited fortunes, but rather that their parents had a right to do as they pleased with their wealth. The crucial distinction for the libertarian view is that just distribution has nothing to do with compensation on the basis of economic contribution.
Many spokespeople for libertarianism conflate the contributory and moral defense of inequality. This is the case with the highly influential Ayn Rand, whose books still sell more than a half million copies each year. Incidentally, she also drew inspiration from Nietzsche's conception of Űbermenschen, living in societies where they are constrained by the weak and lazy Yet there is widespread agreement that individuals should not be greatly hobbled from birth by factors beyond their control. And this value implies that individuals have a claim to certain primary goods (e.g., food, housing, education, and basic health care that are generally seen as comprising a necessary foundation for effective biological and social functioning).
The functional definition of Aproperty@ in a libertarian society is also problematic. One=s own body might constitute personal property by any reasonable definition, but beyond that the issue of property is less clear-cut. Practically, property is an extremely complex issue that must be settled through detailed legal codes, within even the best of which some gray zones remain.
More philosophically, libertarianism has its roots in the natural rights philosophy that developed during the 17 th and 18 th centuries as part of an intellectual struggle to ground legitimation in the natural as opposed to spiritual realm. But the claim that there are natural rights is no longer compelling. Rights are social creations. 45 And like all social creations, their identity and legitimacy can ever be redefined to best meet what is judged as socially ideal.
The most sweeping objection to the libertarian view, however, is simply that outcomes matter, or as Isaiah Berlin famously put it, ATotal liberty for the wolves is death to the lambs@ (1990: 63). The libertarian fixation on processes and indifference to outcomes often leads to conflicts with widely-shared moral intuitions, and even common sense. For example, taken to its logical extreme, libertarianism must claim that no consequences could justify the slightest infringement upon the right to self-ownership. Thus it would be no violation of justice if 10,000 children were to starve in a famine-stricken village as a consequence of all local grain stores having been bought by a wealthy absentee speculator who is holding out for an anticipated price rise.
The Fluid Vertical Social Mobility Approach
The fluid mobility approach argues that inequality is not terribly important, since by dint of hard work, anyone can get rich. It assumes that there is equality of opportunity. This idea of fluid vertical mobility draws upon and is nourished by mainstream economics, especially its conception of human behavior. Mainstream economics assumes that humans are free to choose among bundles of preferences. It fully ignores the social formation of these preferences, the ways in which the economy might shape them. Preferences are simply taken as given. And because all are free to choose, there is an implicit presumption of a fundamental equality of opportunity for all, such that the child of a drug-addicted prostitute would have the same chance of succeeding as the child of a Rockefeller. Americans tend to accept great economic disparities in their society, so long as opportunities for upward mobility exist for those who would take advantage of them.
In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx both noted an exceptionally high degree of vertical mobility in the U.S. and termed it AAmerican exceptionalism.@ However, whatever might have been the case in nineteenth-century America, today such exceptionalism seems no longer valid. A recent study (Jäntti, et. al. 2006 ) of vertical mobility in six wealthy countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 46 has found that the U.S. has less mobility than the other five. As the authors put it, AThe only crystal-clear result is that there is less intergenerational mobility in the U.S. than in the other countries@ (17) . This is supported by a recent OECD study (d=Addio 2007) that finds upward mobility between generations to be lower in the U.S. than in Canada, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Finland, and France (2007).
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Yet Americans continue to believe the myth of American exceptionalism. More than people of other countries, Americans generally believe that it is not so important to have wealthy parents to get ahead, that people are rewarded for effort, that people are rewarded for skills and anyone can acquire them, that the distribution of income is fair, and that government should not intervene to reduce income differences ). Consequently, Americans more readily take credit for their successes and find the poor responsible for their poverty (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2002) .
LEGITIMATING INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. TODAY
The contributory, incentives, trickle-down, libertarian, and fluid vertical mobility approaches to distributive justice have continually provided a powerful theoretical and political under-girding for those who oppose efforts to reduce inequality through policy. These approaches even favor policies that serve to increase inequality, such as tax cuts for the rich and cuts in public goods and social welfare for the poor. The contributory argument insists that those who have more in our economy are typically those who contribute more, with the claim that this is both natural and just. The incentives argument suggests that inequality, or even more of it, is necessary for bringing forth behavior that contributes to economic dynamism. 48 Its trickledown corollary claims that redistributing income to the rich who will save and invest it is best for everyone. The libertarian view asserts that policy measures to reduce inequality are more unjust than the inequality itself, because the former involves the violation of individual rights and the latter does not. And the fluid vertical mobility argument suggests that inequality is not an issue since anyone can by dint of diligence make it to the top.
All five approaches are grounded in theoretical constructs that distort social reality. For example, the contributory approach presumes that the U.S. economy approximates the competitive market model found in textbooks. Yet the actual economy clearly diverges from this model in many ways --imperfect competition, imperfect information, increasing returns to scale, externalities, etc. The incentive argument is likewise unconvincing. Some inequality is certainly necessary for incentives. However, it is not convincing that inequality need be great to bring forth adequate incentives, as is demonstrated by the robust economic performance of economies where inequality is relatively modest. The trickle-down approach assumes that extra income will be productively invested as opposed to spent on luxury consumption or on speculative assets.
The libertarian approach assumes that inequality is the result of voluntary interactions among well-informed, rational individuals, operating within a fully-specified legal system that is itself inspired by libertarian values. Those who draw on this approach to stymie efforts to reduce inequality implicitly deny that sleight-of-hand by the powerful, rather than the free choices of all economic actors, might underlie some existing inequalities B or, more insidiously, the laws and institutions that sustain them. And, as noted above, in the U.S. today the fluid mobility argument is simply not nearly as valid as widely believed.
The Thirty Years Prior to 2008
Relative stagnation in the U.S. during the 1970s in the form of slow growth, high unemployment, and high inflation created a crisis for the aggregate demand orientation of Keynesian economics. It nourished a renaissance of pre-Keynesian economics, and it came forth in a conservative movement that called itself Asupply-side economics.@ Supply-siders claimed that economic dysfunction resulted from bloated government that wasted society=s resources;
over-regulated the economy; over-taxed people (especially the rich) and thereby hindered incentives to work hard, save and invest; and gave welfare to the poor that sapped their will to work. Trickle-down economics was reborn with a vengeance. The Keynesian interlude that had generally been supportive of greater equality was finished.
The response was tax cuts, deregulation, and the weakening of welfare programs. Tax cuts without offsetting spending cuts resulted in record budget deficits, proving wrong supply-siders who claimed that the positive incentive effects would increase government revenues sufficiently to avoid deficits. But the other advocates for tax cuts B whom Ronald Reagan=s Budget Director David Stockman called Astarving the beast@ advocates --found in supply side economics a convenient strategy for cutting government spending, especially on programs that benefit the less well off.
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As noted earlier, the trickle-down doctrine fits well into neoclassical economics, where the behavioral assumption is that everyone is free to choose. No note is taken of individuals= differing aptitudes to freely choose wisely, depending upon how privileged their family background or education. The formation of preferences is ignored, and thus issues like who controls ideology formation are ignored. Presumably, everyone is equally well equipped to choose schools for their children and invest for their retirement. Consequently, the answer for education is private schooling via vouchers, and the answer for retirement is defined-contribution plans and privatized Social Security.
The fiscal crisis afflicting state governments, coupled with an aversion to raising traditional taxes, led them to turn ever more toward gambling for revenues. It is difficult to take But what is so striking is that while Aeconomic@ forces have worked to increase inequality, public policy has worked to augment the effect. That this has been so testifies to the extraordinary command of ideology by the rich. 50 Indeed, any challenge to this trend is immediately labeled as inciting Aclass warfare,@ dredging up images of discredited authoritarian socialism.
Progressive Intentions Foiled by AScience@
Some economists shy away from the topic of inequality on the grounds that it involves value judgments which are beyond the realm of positive or scientific economics. Values, as Milton Friedman so famously put it, involve "differences about which men ultimately only fight." (Friedman 1953: 5 and normative economics, with a testament that their science is concerned only with the former.
But this stance has seldom been convincing to heterodox economists or scholars outside the discipline. The general inability to appreciate the extent to which economics is value-ladened follows from the behavioral assumptions made, the narrow focus of most research, and the relative lack of concern with the history of the discipline or history generally. Yet a quick glance at history reveals that the mainstream expression of economics tends to be supportive of the power and privilege structure of the political world in which it is practiced. In state socialist countries, the mainstream economics was Marxist -Leninist. Scholastic economics was supportive of the social structure of late medieval Europe. Mercantilist economics supported the rising power of the commercial class and the nation state. And since the beginning of modern economics with Adam Smith, mainstream economics has supported the institutions and power structure of capitalism.
CAN THE LEGITIMATION OF INEQUALITY BE DELEGITIMATED?
A glance at history reveals that only rarely has inequality been challenged, even when it has been extreme, thereby testifying to the extraordinary legitimating power of prevailing ideology. In pre-democratic times, the poor (85 to 98 percent of the population) typically lived at or near bare subsistence as a result of any surplus they produced being appropriated by the ruling secular and religious elites. When revolts occurred, it was usually in spontaneous response to acts or events that challenged their already precarious existence. For instance, the greatest medieval peasant uprising, the Great Rising of 1381 A.D. (Tyler's Rebellion) was provoked by the imposition of a poll tax upon peasants who were already living at bare subsistence.
With the rise of democracy and the extension of the franchise to the working class, dissatisfaction could be expressed peaceably via the political process. But protest of inequality still rarely arose, except when the less privileged suffered a substantial deterioration in their condition. The greatest instance of this in American history came in the wake of the onset of the Great Depression. The resulting widespread suffering called into question political and economic policies. It also challenged the prevailing economic theory that legitimated these policies, making space for the Keynesian revolution. For three decades inequality lessened, guided by economic doctrines that depicted greater equality as positive.
There are many parallels between the ideology and policies that led up to the crisis of 1929 and the crisis of 2008. In both instances, the so-called science of economics legitimated inequality, and at times the benefits of greater inequality. The resulting inequality was a major cause of both financial crises (Wisman and Baker 2009 Since the time of Machiavelli, students of social power have suggested that group-based hierarchy is established and maintained by two primary means: through the use of force (e.g., physical intimidation, administrative coercion, and both overt and covert discrimination) and through ideological control and the manipulation of social discourse" (2001: 309).
5 Error! Main Document Only. Jared Diamond describes this relative equality as follows: "Tribes also share with bands an 'egalitarian' social system, without ranked lineages or classes. Not only is status not inherited; no member of a traditional tribe or band can become disproportionately wealthy by his or her own efforts, because each individual has debts and obligations to many others....every able-bodied adult ...participates in growing, gathering, or hunting food" (1997: 272).
6 However, in a few instances, legitimation of inequality was constructed in secular or natural terms, as was generally the case with classical Greek thought. A natural frame of reference was meant when Aristotle noted that "From the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, some for command" (Politics, Book I). 7 The study of legitimation is also referred to as system justification theory (Haines and Jost 2000) .
8 Error! Main Document Only.It has been suggested that humans may be hardwired for religion, because it evolved to help solve the public goods problems of trust and social order. But, as Nicholas Wade has put it, religion came to be "co-opted by the rulers of settled societies as a way of solidifying their authority and justifying their privileged position. Modern states now accomplish by other means many of the early roles performed by religion, which is why religion has become of less relevance to some societies. But because the propensity for religious belief is still wired into the human mind, religion continues to be a potent force in societies that still struggle for cohesion " (2006: 164) .
9 Jared Diamond notes that "Besides justifying the transfer of wealth to kleptocrats, institutionalized religion brings two other benefits to centralized societies. First, shared ideology or religion helps solve the problem of how 41 25 Malthus= treatise was an explicit rejection of the Enlightenment=s faith in the power of reason to improve the lot of all humanity. 26 It is noteworthy that Malthus was an ordained minister, and the views he expressed suggest the enormous distance Christian doctrine had traveled since the Catholic view of the poor as Ablessed.@ This distance is especially evident in the following passage from the second edition of his Essay on Population: AA man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents, on whom he has a just demand, and if the society does not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact has no business to be where he is. At nature=s mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him@ (Malthus 1803: Book IV, Chap. VI, p. 531; cited in Bonar 1924: 304-05) . This passage was excised from later editions. Malthus= view of the poor lends support to Berger and Luckmann=s contention that AIn the period following the Industrial Revolution...there is a certain justification in calling Christianity a bourgeois ideology, because the bourgeoisie used the Christian tradition and its personnel in its struggle against the new industrial working class, which in most European countries could no longer be regarded as >inhabiting= the Christian universe@ (123). And, AEvery group engaged in social conflict requires solidarity. Ideologies generate solidarity@ (124).
